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Dissertation
Trusting Our Own Minds – Metaethical Constructivism and Moral Objectivity
We intuitively think that there are true answers to moral questions and problems. Possibly, we also believe that we only have good reasons to care about morality if there are moral truths and facts. However, is the only way to accommodate moral facts by the adoption of moral realism?
In my dissertation project, I adopt metaethical constructivism to provide a negative answer to this question. Constructivism is the view that moral truths and facts are not discovered or tracked, but rather are the output of idealized, rational reflection. I argue that moral objectivity can be captured in terms of rational reflection, showing how constructivism can justify the existence of moral facts without collapsing into realism. To do so, I develop a new version of Kantian constructivism that focuses on the notion of ‘valuing’.
Werdegang
2016-2019: PhD an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München unter der Betreeung von Prof. Monika Betzler
Seit August 2016: Stipendiat der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
2016 – 2019: wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft am Lehrstuhl für Praktische Philosophie an der LMU
2015: Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Antike Philosophie an der LMU München
2013 – 2015: Studium der Philosophie mit Abschluss Master of Arts an der LMU München
2009 – 2013: Studium der Germanistik und Philosophie an der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. Abschluss Bachelor of Arts