Sofia Bonicalzi is a postdoctoral researcher associated with the Chair of Philosophy of Mind, at the LMU. She specialised in philosophy of mind/action, philosophy of cognitive neuroscience, and moral psychology. Her current research interests focus on the philosophy and neuroscience of volition and action. Before joining the LMU, she has been a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL (Action and Body Group) and at the School of Advanced Study (UoL), working on theoretical aspects of volition, intentions, and responsibility, and carrying out experimental work on the cognitive neuroscience of actions and intentions.
During her postdoctoral experience, she has acquired technical skills in experimental design and techniques, and data analysis. In collaboration with other philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, she is involved in a project grant (SSNAP, Duke University) aimed to conduct theoretical and experimental research on causation, responsibility and counterfactual thinking. She holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Pavia and she has been a visiting Ph.D. candidate at the Sage School of Philosophy, at Cornell University.
- CV Sofia Bonicalzi (152 KByte)
Articles in Peer-Reviewed Journals
Bonicalzi, S., Gallotti, M. (in press), “The participatory dimension of individual responsibility”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences;
Beyer, F., Sidarus, N., Bonicalzi, S., Haggard, P. (2016), “Beyond self-serving bias: diffusion of responsibility reduces sense of agency and outcome monitoring”, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 11 (12), pp. 1-8;
Bonicalzi, S. (2015), “Libet-like experiments and the efficacy of the will”, Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 6 (1), pp. 130-144;
Bonicalzi, S. (2015), “Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility”, Phenomenology and Mind. Naturalism, the First-Person Perspective and the Embodied Mind, 7, pp. 128-135;
Bonicalzi, S. (2013), “Moral Responsibility beyond Classical Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Accounts”, Prolegomena, 12 (1), pp. 21-41;
Bonicalzi, S. (2013), “La Montagna Dipinta” (“The Painted Mountain”), Fata Morgana, 21, pp. 157-163;
Bonicalzi, S. (2014), “Defining practical reasoning. Constructivism and Instrumental Reason”, in S. Bonicalzi, L. Caffo, M. Sorgon, eds., Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.
Bonicalzi, S. (2014), “Skepticism and Control”, in F. Bacchini, M. Dell’Utri, S. Caputo, eds., New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, pp. 144-164;
Bonicalzi, S., M. De Caro (2013), “Introduction”, in Id., eds., “Free Will: Thirty points of view”, special issue of Methode. Analytic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-4;
Bonicalzi, S., M. De Caro (2013), eds., “Free Will: Thirty points of view”, special issue of Methode. Analytic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 3;
Bonicalzi, S., L. Caffo, M. Sorgon (2014), eds., Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.
Bonicalzi, S. (2012), review of John Martin Fischer, Deep Control. Essays on Free Will and Value, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, No. 3, Milano, Franco Angeli, pp. 643-646.