# Dr. Julien Murzi

External Member (Kent)

## Kontakt

E-Mail:
J.Murzi@gmail.com

Website:
http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/staff/Julien-Murzi.html

Website:
http://jmurzi.wordpress.com/

Weitere Informationen

I earned a first PhD in Philosophy in 2008 at the University of Rome ''La Sapienza'', with a thesis on the knowability paradox, supervised by Cesare Cozzo and Carlo Cellucci. In 2010, I completed a second PhD in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, under the supervision of Bob Hale and Dominic Gregory. I spent the final year of my PhD at the University of St Andrews, on an Analysis Studentship. After finishing my British PhD, I was a post-doctoral fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU, Munich), until mid-January 2012. I regularly visit the centre during the Spring or Summer.

## Research Interests

I specialize in the philosophies of logic and language and in metaphysics, but I also have serious interests in formal semantics and proof-theory. I have written papers on semantic paradoxes, logical revision, the knowability paradox, logical inferentialism, the epistemology of logic, and the semantics of future contingents.

I think there's much to be learned from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry - seemingly valid proofs of unacceptable conclusions. I'm currently exploring some recently much-discussed substructural solutions to these paradoxes - solutions which involve rejecting very basic rules of logic apparently involved in all paradoxical reasonings, but the failure of which is hard to make independent sense of. Oddly enough, I'm also very much interested in - rival - contextualist solutions to the semantic paradoxes. Contextualists preserve classical logic, but offer a more complicated conception of truth-predications - one according to which, when we prove the Liar sentence ('I'm not true') and conclude that it must after all express a true proposition, we have shifted context, and moved to a more inclusive interpretation of the truth-predicate.

My recent work includes more work on semantic paradoxes and logical inferentialism, as well as projects on indefinite extensibility, logical disagreement, logical consequence, logical revision, proof-theoretic harmony, and contextualist approaches to semantic paradox. I'm increasingly interested in the connections between logic, normativity and rationality.