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Thomas Wyrwich: Kants Anti-Spinozismus - Eine Antwort auf Omri Boehm, in: Kant-Studien 1/2014, S. 113-124 [Sprache des Aufsatzes: Deutsch].

Abstract: In a paper (recently published in the Kant-Studien) Omri Boehm claims that Kant argues for a “Spinozist substance monism” in his pre-critical writing Über den einzigen Beweisgrund vom Dasein Gottes (as an adequate understanding of God) and that he conserves this principle, henceforth as a regulative one, in the shape of the transcendental ideal in the first Critique. I try to reply on the basis of the following considerations: first, Kant is at least literally rejecting the idea of God as the one and only substance in the Beweisgrund, apparently by regarding as correct a different understanding of “substance” than that had by Spinoza. Second, the transcendental ideal also has a non- or even anti-Spinozist character in three regards, which can be deduced with the support of several restrictive and regulative claims of transcendental theology and physicotheology, which are still accepted by the critical Kant: it is designed as an extramundane principle; it is identified as a global ground of a consequence; and it is conceived as a potential, non-excludable source of purposive structures in the world.


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